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<p><span>Carbon-Free Europe welcomes the European Commission’s 2025 Work Programme and its commitment to strengthening Europe’s energy security, industrial competitiveness, and decarbonisation efforts. With the </span><strong>Clean Industrial Deal, the Action Plan on Affordable Energy, and the Roadmap to End Russian Energy Imports</strong><span>, the Commission has set a clear direction. It is critical that these commitments translate into tangible actions that deliver a secure, affordable, and competitive clean energy system for Europe.</span></p>
<h2><strong>A Strong Start, but Speed and Scale Are Critical</strong></h2>
<p><span>CFE supports the Commission’s recognition that energy availability and affordability is the foundation of industrial competitiveness. Europe's ability to lead in clean industrial innovation hinges on its capacity to turn policy ambition into real-world deployment. High energy costs and slow project approvals are eroding competitiveness, while global rivals move quickly to capture market share in clean technology. <strong>The </strong></span><strong>Industrial Decarbonisation Accelerator Act and Fitness Check on Energy Security</strong><span> must do more than assess challenges—they must remove private investment barriers, and create the conditions for industries to scale clean solutions at pace. Without urgent reform, Europe risks not just higher costs but a shrinking role in the industries of the future. </span></p>
<p><span>Removing barriers to </span><strong>clean hydrogen, carbon capture and storage (CCS), and low-carbon fuels</strong><span> is critical to ensuring that decarbonisation strengthens, rather than weakens, industrial competitiveness. Delays in clean energy investment and continued reliance on external energy sources expose Europe to supply shocks and rising industrial costs. Failing to accelerate clean technology deployment will only increase economic risk and undermine long-term energy security. </span></p>
<p><span>Without decisive action, Europe risks losing its competitive edge to regions like the U.S. and China, which are rapidly scaling up clean energy but also benefiting from lower energy costs due to continued reliance on fossil fuels and less stringent climate commitments. While Europe has set the standard for ambitious decarbonisation</span><strong><span>,</span></strong><span> its </span><strong>ability to compete globally depends on making clean energy an economic advantage rather than a cost burden<span>. </span></strong><span>By accelerating clean technology deployment, streamlining permitting, and ensuring affordable access to low-carbon energy, Europe can enhance its industrial competitiveness while maintaining its leadership in the net-zero transition.</span></p>
<h2><strong>Decarbonisation as an Economic Strategy</strong></h2>
<p><span>CFE recognises the ambition of the proposed 90% reduction target by 2040, as outlined in the </span><strong>amendment of the European Climate Law</strong><span>, and the EU’s ongoing efforts to phase out fossil fuel dependencies. However, ambition alone is not enough. To be credible, the EU must provide the right market signals, including unlocking private financing barriers, to ensure that European industries can decarbonise while remaining competitive. </span><strong>Technology inclusivity is key</strong><span>—all clean energy solutions, including renewables, nuclear, hydrogen, and CCS, must be fully leveraged to maximise Europe’s trajectory to achieving climate targets in the fastest and most economically beneficial way.</span></p>
<h2><strong>Where More Action is Needed</strong></h2>
<p><span>Further action is needed to ensure the success of Europe’s clean energy and industrial strategy. </span><span>As part of the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), the European Competitiveness Fund should guarantee robust investment capacity to support key technologies and strategic sectors vital to the EU’s competitiveness and decarbonisation pathway.</span><span> The </span><strong>EU’s financing framework</strong> <span>must provide clear mechanisms for Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs), investment de-risking, and infrastructure expansion to attract global capital. Expanding the </span><a href="https://climate.ec.europa.eu/eu-action/eu-funding-climate-action/innovation-fund_en"><span>Innovation Fund</span></a><span> and introducing </span><strong>cleantech investment guarantees</strong><span> will help bridge the gap between policy ambition and market realities. </span></p>
<p><span>However, achieving Europe’s climate and competitiveness goals cannot rely solely on public finances, it requires greater private investment. Therefore it remains key to further build out one of the <strong>EU’s greatest asset, its Single Market,</strong> and make significant progress on the integration of EU’s capital markets. While the upcoming communication on the Savings and Investments Union shows the recognition of this objective, it will be key to follow through on this project with ambitious initiatives to facilitate investments and promote the use of private capital to  scale clean technologies and drive industrial decarbonisation.</span></p>
<p><strong>Permitting delays</strong><span> remain one of the biggest obstacles to clean energy deployment. Without meaningful reform, Europe risks losing momentum in building the infrastructure needed to meet its climate and competitiveness goals (see Figure 1). </span><strong>A technology-inclusive approach</strong><span> is also essential in driving deep industrial decarbonisation. Nuclear power derived hydrogen must be fully-recognised under EU policies, and CCS must be integrated into industrial decarbonisation strategies to provide viable pathways for hard-to-abate sectors.</span></p>
<h2><strong>Our Call to Action</strong></h2>
<p><span>The EU’s 2025 Work Programme sets the right direction, but now words must be followed by actions. Delivering a secure, decarbonised, and competitive Europe requires </span><strong>pragmatic, investment-driven policies that remove regulatory bottlenecks, provide clear financial incentives, and create a level playing field for all clean energy solutions.</strong></p>
<p><strong>Figure 1</strong><span>: A snapshot of CFE’s downscaled infrastructure map that provides a more granular picture of the deployment of clean energy for a variety of decarbonisation scenarios. </span><strong>Click on image to get to our downscaled infrastructure map tool</strong><span> and check out your area of interest. On the website, hover over the map to see just how much buildout is needed to reach net-zero.</span></p>
<p><a href="https://public.tableau.com/app/profile/cfe2024/viz/DownscaledMaps/MAP"><span><img src="//images.ctfassets.net/228txxvb8tt7/2aFpNby6TKLARMhtkmgQGD/cae9bdc4876b34afbf82078d6706fe0a/CFE-Infrastructure_.png" alt="" width="2407" height="1080"></span></a></p>

Ambition Must Translate into Action: 2025 Commission Work Programme

Powering Europe’s Clean Future: Romania’s Role in Hydrogen and Carbon Capture and Storage Infrastructure

<p><span>The European Union’s ambitious hydrogen targets are central to its strategy for achieving net-zero emissions by 2050, with hydrogen positioned to decarbonise hard-to-abate sectors like industry and transport. In 2022, the </span><a href="https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal/repowereu-affordable-secure-and-sustainable-energy-europe_en" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em><span>REPowerEU</span></em></a> <span>set strategic goals to produce 10 million tonnes of renewable hydrogen domestically and import another 10 million tonnes by 2030. By 2050, hydrogen is expected to supply around 10% of the EU’s energy needs.</span></p>
<p><span>Yet, the </span><a href="https://hydrogeneurope.eu/hydrogen-is-key-building-block-2040-targets/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span>European Commission’s current impact assessment</span></a><span> projects only 3 million tonnes of hydrogen by 2030—far below the 10 million tonne target. This gap highlights a mismatch between the scale of the EU's ambitions and the capacities of its current policy. To scale hydrogen production, the EU must surpass tremendous technological, economic, and regulatory barriers—it should not come as a surprise that the </span><a href="https://www.eca.europa.eu/en/publications/SR-2024-11" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span>European Court of Auditors</span></a><span> has called for a "reality check,” noting concerns about whether sufficient demand can support such large volumes of hydrogen.</span></p>
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<p><span>Our </span><a href="https://www.carbonfreeeurope.org/modelling" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span>2024 Annual Decarbonisation Perspective</span></a>—<span>which maps Europe’s various pathways to net-zero— suggests that Europe’s domestic clean hydrogen supply and demand could reach 20-22 million tonnes by 2050 (see Figure 1), around 4-5% of final energy consumption (see Figure 2), which is below the 10% projected by </span><a href="https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal/repowereu-affordable-secure-and-sustainable-energy-europe_en" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em><span>REPowerEU</span></em></a><span>. </span></p>
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<p><span>The central focus of these metrics should be to achieve EU decarbonisation through a balanced energy system. Rapidly scaling up hydrogen production, especially green hydrogen, which demands significant renewable energy, could divert resources from sectors where direct electrification is more efficient. A pragmatic strategy would prioritise hydrogen for hard-to-decarbonise sectors, like shipping and aviation, while reserving direct electrification for heating and other applications where it’s more effective. </span></p>
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<h2><strong>Recommendations: </strong></h2>
<p><strong>Tech-Inclusive PPAs:</strong><span> Implement PPAs for diverse low-carbon sources, ensuring a stable energy supply to support hydrogen production at scale.</span></p>
<p><strong>Funding Mechanisms:</strong><span> The new EU budget should enable these funds (or these new fund structures) to address critical needs:</span></p>
<ul>
<li>
<span>The </span><a href="https://climate.ec.europa.eu/eu-action/eu-funding-climate-action/innovation-fund_en" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em><span>European Innovation Fund</span></em></a><span> can support hydrogen infrastructure and storage projects.</span>
</li>
<li>
<a href="https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/funding/funding-opportunities/funding-programmes-and-open-calls/horizon-europe_en" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em><span>Horizon Europe</span></em></a><span> can advance hydrogen R&amp;D, fostering innovation across the supply chain.</span>
</li>
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<span>The </span><a href="https://cinea.ec.europa.eu/programmes/connecting-europe-facility_en" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em><span>Connecting Europe Facility</span></em></a><span> can fund crucial grid upgrades and interconnections needed to integrate hydrogen production and demand.</span>
</li>
</ul>
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<p><span>So while the EU may face challenges in meeting its ambitious 2030 hydrogen targets, this should not deter long-term planning. The 2040 hydrogen goals remain attainable with a pragmatic, balanced approach to decarbonisation and a flexible, adaptive strategy. This should involve setting clear intermediate milestones and regularly assessing infrastructure readiness, technological progress, and supply chain integration.</span></p>
<h2><strong>Expanding Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) and Diversifying Energy Sources</strong></h2>
<p><span>To fully unlock hydrogen’s potential, immediate action is needed to address infrastructure gaps including electrolyser manufacturing and deployment, regulatory challenges, and the diversity of energy sources. Relying solely on renewables for hydrogen production could limit scalability and stability, while incorporating a wider array of low-carbon sources—such as nuclear via Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs)—will ensure a reliable hydrogen supply that can adapt to demand growth.</span></p>
<h2><strong>Leveraging EU Funding Mechanisms for a Resilient Supply Chain</strong></h2>
<p><span>Leveraging EU funding mechanisms such as the </span><a href="https://climate.ec.europa.eu/eu-action/eu-funding-climate-action/innovation-fund_en" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em><span>European Innovation Fund</span></em></a><span>, </span><a href="https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/funding/funding-opportunities/funding-programmes-and-open-calls/horizon-europe_en" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em><span>Horizon Europe</span></em></a><span>, and the </span><a href="https://cinea.ec.europa.eu/programmes/connecting-europe-facility_en" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em><span>Connecting Europe Facility</span></em></a><span> is crucial to support hydrogen infrastructure, R&amp;D, and necessary grid upgrades. These funds can drive essential investments to scale hydrogen production while supporting technological advances across the value chain. With targeted funding for both deployment and infrastructure, the EU can ensure a resilient hydrogen supply that aligns with its climate and energy security goals. The new EU budget should ensure these funding mechanisms are accessible and the process is as streamlined as possible. </span></p>
<h2><strong>Supporting a Full Hydrogen Supply Chain through Hydrogen Valleys</strong></h2>
<p><span>The </span><a href="https://www.clean-hydrogen.europa.eu/get-involved/hydrogen-valleys_en" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span>EU’s Hydrogen Valleys</span></a><span> offer a whole-systems approach, integrating hydrogen production, storage, and usage across local economies. Supported by initiatives like the </span><a href="https://www.clean-hydrogen.europa.eu/index_en" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span>Clean Hydrogen Partnership</span></a><span>, these Hydrogen Valleys demonstrate hydrogen’s scalability and its role in building a skilled, competitive workforce for Europe. Projects in regions like the </span><a href="https://heavenn.org/about/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span>Northern Netherlands</span></a><span> and </span><a href="https://www.moeveglobal.com/en/press/spain-and-the-netherlands-promote-the-green-hydrogen-maritime-corridor" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span>Spain’s Hydrogen Corridor</span></a><span> are essential for meeting both EU competitiveness and net-zero goals.</span></p>
<h2><strong>Conclusion</strong></h2>
<p><span>To achieve the EU's decarbonisation goals and enhance competitiveness, prioritising hydrogen for hard-to-decarbonise sectors while ensuring a balanced use of renewable resources is crucial. By investing now in Hydrogen Valleys, accelerating market creation for hydrogen and an inclusive framework, the EU can establish a resilient hydrogen economy, enhancing energy security and decarbonisation efforts across the continent.</span></p>

Turning a 2030 Shortfall into a 2040 Win: The Case for Flexible Hydrogen Policy

<p><span>Carbon-Free Europe (CFE) welcomes the European Commission’s continued work on developing a robust methodology for assessing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions savings from low-carbon fuels. However, </span><strong>excluding key low-carbon energy sources from this process risks diminishing the role hydrogen can play in the energy transition, and more broadly slowing the transition overall .</strong><span> To fully realise the true potential of low-carbon hydrogen production, it is critical that the methodology takes into account the role of these key low-carbon energy sources in hydrogen electrolysis, such as nuclear power, particularly through Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) and Contracts for Differences (CfDs).</span></p>
<p><span>One of the key issues with the current draft is the reliance on the </span><strong>bidding region/national average emissions</strong><span> intensities when calculating the GHG emissions associated with electricity used for hydrogen production. This approach </span><strong>risks distorting the actual environmental impact of hydrogen production</strong><span> by failing to reflect the specific energy mix used in real-time. In particular, averaging emissions at the country level can obscure the contributions of clean energy sources like nuclear power, which may supply low-carbon electricity during times when renewable generation is unavailable or insufficient. Such a distortion toward a resource with significantly growing demand in the coming decades could significantly impact its supply and thus any energy transition opportunities related to it.</span></p>
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<p><span>CFE’s energy systems modelling shows that </span><strong>clean hydrogen demand will grow 50x</strong><span>, with 4-5% of total final energy consumption by 2050 (see Figure 1). With that contribution, </span><strong>clean</strong> <strong>hydrogen</strong> <strong>has the potential to play a transformative role</strong><span> in decarbonising hard-to-abate sectors such as heavy industry and long-haul transport. However, the type of hydrogen supply—whether through steam reforming (grey hydrogen) or electrolysis (green/clean hydrogen)—makes a critical difference for emissions purposes. Our model foresees the use of grey hydrogen until 2045 (see Figure 2), and with that GHG emissions in the production of hydrogen. But to accelerate the transition to hydrogen produced via electrolysis, we must </span><strong>ensure the availability of sufficient clean electricity</strong><span>. This requires a commitment to supporting diverse low-carbon electricity sources, including nuclear, through mechanisms like PPAs. Electricity demand is growing everywhere and at a rapid pace, as the need to decarbonise our economy accelerates. </span><strong>Hence, the regulatory framework should reflect a pragmatic approach where all viable low-carbon energy sources are at our disposal.</strong><span> Doing otherwise significantly increases delivery risk as the EU prepares  for a tripling of electricity demand across all sources (see Figure 3). </span></p>
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<p><span>Additionally, excluding nuclear PPAs from the Delegated Act risks underestimating the contribution that nuclear power can make to the energy system. Nuclear energy provides a low-emissions, stable electricity source that can complement renewable generation, especially during periods of low renewable output. The current methodology misrepresents the true emissions reductions that nuclear power can achieve in low-carbon hydrogen production. </span><strong>To prevent an unfair penalty toward low-carbon hydrogen producers, and to fully account for the actual source of electricity, and secure the energy system, nuclear PPAs should be included in the low-carbon hydrogen definition before 2028.</strong></p>
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<p><span>Finally, to ensure that the EU’s hydrogen strategy is both effective and equitable, it is essential that the methodology for assessing GHG emissions savings represents a truly technology neutral approach that relies on all viable technologies. The EU’s climate targets and its broader decarbonisation strategy will require the scaling of multiple clean energy technologies in tandem (see Figure 2), and focusing solely on renewables for low-carbon fuels narrows the path to decarbonisation. </span><strong>By including nuclear PPAs in the low-carbon hydrogen definition and the emissions calculation framework, the EU can better support scaling of low-carbon fuels and ensure a competitive, secure, and cost-effective transition to net-zero.</strong></p>
<p><span>Given the urgent need to meet the EU’s decarbonisation objectives, there is no time to delay the inclusion of nuclear PPAs in the current methodology. Long-term planning and significant investments are needed for nuclear facilities, so the sooner these PPAs are in place, the more effectively the EU can scale up hydrogen production. By acting now, the EU can ensure that the infrastructure and energy sources needed for hydrogen production are aligned with its long-term climate and energy security goals.</span></p>
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<h2>Recommendations for Adjusting the Delegated Act</h2>
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<li aria-level="1">
<strong>Explicit Inclusion of Nuclear PPAs:</strong><span> The Delegated Act should explicitly include nuclear PPAs for low-carbon hydrogen production, as nuclear power provides stable, low-emissions electricity that complements renewable energy.</span>
</li>
<li aria-level="1">
<strong>Technology-Neutral Approach:</strong><span> Ensure that all low-carbon energy sources, including nuclear, are recognised in the emissions calculation methodology, encouraging flexibility in achieving net-zero and enhancing energy security.</span>
</li>
<li aria-level="1">
<strong>Shift to Source-Specific Emissions:</strong><span> Move away from using national average emissions for hydrogen production, and instead, account for the actual electricity source to provide a more accurate and fair reflection of GHG savings.</span>
</li>
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<p><span>Incorporating these recommendations would reflect the full spectrum of low-carbon energy options available. CFE emphasises the importance of including nuclear PPAs and adopting a technology neutral approach. By doing so, the EU can better support electricity growth and hydrogen production while maintaining its competitiveness in the global energy transition.</span></p>

Ensuring Accurate Accounting for Low-Carbon Hydrogen Production through Nuclear Power PPAs

<p><span>As part of implementing the emissions reduction targets outlined in the European Green Deal, Romania has adopted its Long-Term Strategy (LTS) for Decarbonisation until 2050 and is currently revising its National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP). To support Romania in finalising these strategies, Carbon-Free Europe (CFE), in partnership with <a href="https://www.evolved.energy/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Evolved Energy Research</a> and the <a href="https://www.enpg.ro/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Energy Policy Group</a> (EPG), have developed a detailed energy systems model to outline clear steps Romania can take to hit its 2030, 2040, and 2050 climate targets while driving economic growth.</span></p>
<p><span>This analysis explores multiple decarbonisation pathways for Romania, considering combinations of all carbon-free technologies and policies that can guide Romania towards climate neutrality. The study highlights key measures for policymakers and broader stakeholders  to consider  including expanding clean energy capacities, electrifying key sectors, reducing final energy consumption, and limiting natural gas investments.</span></p>
<p><span>Romania’s energy landscape is currently characterised by its reliance on coal and natural gas, making the transition to clean energy a complex challenge. To meet the EU’s ambitious climate targets, including a 55% reduction in net greenhouse gas emissions by 2030, the country will need to accelerate its shift to clean energy, increase energy efficiency, and invest in new technologies such as carbon capture and storage (CCS) and hydrogen. Deploying and expanding CCS and hydrogen infrastructure by 2030 and beyond will play a critical role in decarbonising Romania’s industry and ensuring energy security. </span></p>
<p><span>With the right combination of clean technologies and policies, Romania can not only decarbonise its economy in line with the EU’s net-zero commitments, but ensure continued economic growth and durable energy security. This study provides Romania with insights into realistic pathways to meet climate targets, offering clear, data-driven scenarios. For more detailed analysis, click here for the full <u><a title="https://www.enpg.ro/pathways-for-decarbonising-romanias-economy/" href="https://www.enpg.ro/pathways-for-decarbonising-romanias-economy/" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-ogsc="" data-outlook-id="142b919b-4b27-4048-8d5c-f760c69ebcdb">policy paper</a></u>, and deep dives on <u><a title="https://www.enpg.ro/the-role-of-carbon-capture-in-romanias-low-carbon-economy/" href="https://www.enpg.ro/the-role-of-carbon-capture-in-romanias-low-carbon-economy/" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-ogsc="" data-outlook-id="68691cad-f839-478a-b7f9-ca423556cb10">CCS</a></u> and <u><a title="https://www.enpg.ro/the-role-of-hydrogen-in-romanias-low-carbon-economy/" href="https://www.enpg.ro/the-role-of-hydrogen-in-romanias-low-carbon-economy/" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-ogsc="" data-outlook-id="57661c73-23fc-43af-90e6-9b161b60cbe9">hydrogen</a>.</u></span></p>
<p><span>To explore all of our results, see below the full data Tableau.</span></p>
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Pathways for Decarbonising Romania’s Economy

<p><span>In anticipation of Poland’s submission of its updated National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP/KPEiK) to the European Commission in June 2024, </span><strong>Carbon-Free Europe (CFE)</strong><span> commissioned Evolved Energy Research, in collaboration with the Silesian University of Technology (SUT), the Institute of Power Engineering - National Research Institute, and Princeton University’s Andlinger Center, to conduct an </span><strong>extensive energy systems modelling study</strong><span>. The objective of the two-phase project is to </span><strong>delineate pathways for Poland to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050</strong><span>, thereby informing not only the NECP revision but also future policies, national strategies, and long-term investments.</span></p>
<p><span>The </span><strong>two-phase Net-Zero Poland (NZP) study</strong><span> provides a first-of-its-kind, detailed and transparent articulation of alternative pathways for Poland to transition to net-zero emissions by 2050. The study aims to inform energy-transition strategy, policy formulation, and investment decision making in both the public and private sectors. Below you can find the results of the</span><strong> first phase </strong><span>of the project, which was </span><strong>led by CFE</strong><span> and provides critical and data-based insights on a national and international level. The </span><strong>second phase, led by SUT</strong><span>, will use the data to run a higher spatial resolution model that enables key land-use, socio-technical, environmental, and investment challenges to be discussed at the voivodeship, powiat, and gminas level.</span></p>
<p><span>Poland’s energy landscape remains </span><strong>more heavily reliant on fossil fuels</strong><span> compared to other EU Member States. Because of this, Poland faces unique challenges to meet the EU’s ambitious emissions reduction targets under the Fit for 55 package, while ensuring coal regions are not left behind and energy prices remain affordable. The </span><a href="https://commission.europa.eu/publications/poland-draft-updated-necp-2021-2030_en" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span>NECP draft update</span></a><span> sets </span><strong>ambitious targets for Poland</strong><span>, aiming for a 29.8% share of renewable energy sources (RES) in gross final energy consumption by 2030 (compared to 9.4% in 2022).</span><span><sup>1</sup></span></p>
<p><span>With a well-designed implementation strategy, Poland can achieve a just transition, zero-emission energy system, and improved air quality as outlined in the proposed </span><a href="https://www.gov.pl/web/climate/energy-policy-of-poland-until-2040-epp2040" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span>Energy Policy of Poland until 2040 (PEP2040)</span></a><span>. This strategy relies on a </span><strong>diverse energy mix to be successful</strong><span>, including accelerating renewable deployment alongside nuclear energy. </span></p>
<p><span>Our analysis explored </span><strong>eight different pathways for Poland to reach net-zero</strong><span>, each of which has different cost implications and feasibility risks. In this report, we </span><strong>highlight results in six key areas</strong><span>: 1) achieving clean heat, 2) future of coal with carbon capture and storage, 3) role of nuclear energy, 4) renewable resource availability, 5) essential hydrogen interconnector, and 6) electric vehicles.</span></p>
<p><span>The full technical report can be found <a href="https://assets.ctfassets.net/228txxvb8tt7/2iDzvF9Di2nVrTywjEAdER/dbdcc3fbbd738d4abd902d190f4f1507/Poland_NECP_Analysis.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">here</a>. A full data Tableau with interactive results can be found at the end of this publication.</span></p>
<h2><span>Achieving Clean Heat</span></h2>
<p><span>Achieving a clean and decarbonised heating system for Poland requires two main strategies 1) replacing in-home coal and biomass boilers with heat pumps and 2) decarbonising steam supply for district heating and industry. Today, around 60% of residential buildings rely on coal or biomass boilers, 35% on district heating systems, and 5% on heat pumps. In our Core pathway, the percentage of homes with heat pumps needs to jump to 17% by 2030 and 45% by 2050. These heat pumps replace in-home coal and biomass boilers while district heating systems are preserved and decarbonised upstream. To achieve this goal, Poland requires a supply chain to install heat pumps in over 200,000 homes per year and more than quadruple electricity supply by 2050. </span></p>
<p><span>Below you can see how steam for district heating, as well as industry, is decarbonised. Currently, steam is principally produced through coal power plants and boilers. The coal phaseout for steam production is achieved primarily through the deployment of large heat pumps, with some gasification in the short-term. Beyond 2030, nuclear facilities also play an important role in providing steam, providing up to 14% of supply.</span></p>
<h4><span><strong>Figure 1:</strong> Steam production across all modelled pathways.</span></h4>
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<h2><span>Future of Coal with Carbon Capture and Storage</span></h2>
<p><span>Our pathway “High Coal w/ CCS” models what would happen if Poland were to keep coal in its energy economy system with up to 15 GW of coal capacity by 2050, equal to about 50% of the current fleet. We ran this pathway not to recommend preserving coal capacity, but to demonstrate the trade-offs in a strategy banking on carbon capture technology with coal or hoping to delay renewable deployment for future technology breakthroughs. As you can see in Figure 2, keeping coal creates a lower need for gas power compared to the Core pathway, but it does not negate the need for nuclear and renewables.</span></p>
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<strong>Figure 2: </strong><span>Electricity capacity in the “Core” versus the “High Coal w/ CCS” pathway</span>
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<p><span>There are two potentially insurmountable challenges with the “High Coal w/ CCS” pathway: 1) costs and 2) carbon capture transport and storage infrastructure needs. A future bound to coal is the highest cost pathway and extremely expensive toward 2050 with at least 8.0 billion EUR more investments compared to our "Core" Pathway in the year of 2050 alone. It also requires over 100 megatons (Mt) of CO</span><sub><span>2</span></sub><span> exports annually on top of an annual 20 Mt domestic CO<sub>2</sub></span><span> sequestration and some domestic CO</span><sub><span>2</span></sub><span> utilisation (</span><strong>Figure 3</strong><span>). Achieving these scales of operations for both sequestration and export requires careful planning. Expanding CO</span><sub><span>2</span></sub><span> pipelines to Germany and other Central European countries as well as the Nordics is required in all pathways, but needs to be scaled up significantly in the case of keeping coal within the energy system.</span></p>
<p><span>Irrespective of the economics of CO</span><sub><span>2</span></sub><span> pipelines and deployment of carbon capture, utilisation, and storage (CCUS) technology, Poland will need to adhere to the European Union’s Renewable Energy Directive (</span><a href="https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/renewable-energy/renewable-energy-directive-targets-and-rules/renewable-energy-directive_en" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span>RED III</span></a><span>) and account for ageing coal infrastructure that will need replacement regardless of climate targets.</span></p>
<h4><span><strong>Figure 3:</strong> Carbon capture sequestration in Poland, export, and utilisation.</span></h4>
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<h2><span>Role of Nuclear Energy</span></h2>
<p><span>In all our model pathways nuclear energy plays a significant role in providing zero carbon electricity for the power sector as well as steam for industrial processes and district heating (see “Achieving Clean Heat”) and hydrogen production (see “Essential Hydrogen Interconnector”). We consider the potential of different sizes and types of reactors, including large light water reactors and advanced small modular reactors. </span></p>
<p><span>In the power sector, nuclear energy provides 19 GW of electric capacity by 2050 in our “Core” pathway. With less nuclear deployment due to cost constraints, represented with our “High Nuclear Costs” pathway, Poland would need to deploy more than three times the capacity of alternative clean energy resources. Figure 4 shows that replacing 19 GW of nuclear energy requires building more than 70 GW of alternative resources including majority solar, offshore wind, gas, and storage. The total electric capacity needs to be higher to provide the same electricity generation, including an increased gas peaker capacity and more electric storage to balance the grid. </span></p>
<h4><span><strong>Figure 4:</strong> Change in electricity capacity for the “High Nuclear Costs” pathways compared to “Core”</span></h4>
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<p><span>Offshore wind power becomes especially important in any pathway with limited nuclear energy deployment as solar and onshore wind power are using almost all available resources (see Figure 6). As you can see in Figure 5, the technologies have an inverse deployment relationship. High nuclear cost increases offshore wind demand and vice versa as shown by the “High Offshore Wind Costs” pathway. Considering cost and subsequent deployment uncertainties, a flexible framework that incentivizes the buildout of both nuclear and offshore wind is necessary.</span></p>
<h4><span><strong>Figure 5:</strong> Electricity generation across all modelled scenarios.</span></h4>
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<h2><span>Renewable Resource Availability</span></h2>
<p><span>The EU requires Poland to reach 42.5% renewables in final energy consumption by 2030, a target that Poland can reach considering wind and solar resource potential. In our analysis, we consider the potential of renewable resources based on land use availability, resource quality, and relative economics compared to other clean energy resources. Reaching this target for final energy consumption will require Poland to ramp up its current power sector target of 50% renewables by 2030 and the electrification of the transportation sector (see “Electric Vehicles”). Our pathways suggest Poland should achieve 60-66% renewables in the power sector by 2030 even while total electricity generation increases by 50% compared to 2022.</span></p>
<p><span>Below you can see the Wind and Solar Resource Potential for Poland (orange) and how much of the renewable resources are used in each pathway over time (blue) to meet the renewable energy share. Onshore wind is a valuable resource that is maxed out in all pathways by 2040, except in a pathway where we explicitly prevent additional onshore wind builds. The vast majority of fixed offshore wind resources are used up over time as well and most pathways are also tapping into more expensive floating offshore wind resources. If nuclear power is prevented due to high cost or if onshore wind cannot be deployed, both fixed and floating offshore wind resources are facing maximum use. Solar is deployed across all pathways and large-scale deployment is maxed out if nuclear deployment is limited.</span></p>
<h4><span><strong>Figure 6:</strong> Wind and solar resource potential.</span></h4>
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<h2><span>Essential Hydrogen Interconnector</span></h2>
<p><span>Poland is currently the third largest hydrogen producer (1.3 Mt H</span><span>2</span><span>/year<sup>2</sup></span><span>) and consumer (0.8 Mt H</span><span>2</span><span>/year<sup>3</sup></span><span>) in Europe and fifth largest producer in the world. Building on this workforce and experience, Poland can establish a clean hydrogen industry that fulfils domestic hydrogen demand (a key priority for energy security) and interconnects and exports hydrogen from the Baltics to Germany and other nations in need. </span></p>
<p><span>Figure 7 shows Poland’s domestic hydrogen production. Across all pathways, Poland can leverage its hydrogen experience, future nuclear and offshore power, and biomass resources to become a large-scale hydrogen producer. The “High Biomass” pathway sees the most hydrogen product due to expanded BECCS hydrogen and nuclear heat electrolysis potential.</span></p>
<p><span>Poland’s strategic location makes it an essential hydrogen interconnector for pipelines between the Baltics and Germany and other Central European countries. As shown in Figure 7, Poland can take hydrogen from the Baltics and domestic production, use it as a feedstock to produce e-fuels and ammonia, and export these alternative fuels. Fostering collaboration and strategic partnerships with neighbouring countries will create a cohesive regional hydrogen and alternative fuel network, leveraging an economic opportunity for Poland as a hydrogen interconnector.</span></p>
<h4><span><strong>Figure 7: </strong>Hydrogen supply and demand</span></h4>
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<h2><span>Electric Vehicles</span></h2>
<p><span>Early and large-scale electrification, especially of the transportation sector, plays a vital role in the transition to a net-zero emissions economy. The difference between a short-term (“Core” pathway) and long-term electrification (“Slow Consumer Uptake” pathway) in transportation is a much higher price tag during a delayed transportation electrification. </span></p>
<p><span>Below are the additional costs or savings by 2030 or 2050 compared to our Reference pathway that does not achieve net-zero emissions. On the one hand, slow electrification in transportation saves money in the near-term as no or little investments are made into electric vehicle infrastructure. On the other hand, slow electrification ends up costing significantly more money in the long-term because the system has little build-out of cost- and energy-efficient EV infrastructure and requires a higher dependency on expensive zero-emissions liquid fuels to achieve net-zero targets.</span></p>
<p><span>The electric vehicle deployment differences between the Core and Slow Consumer Uptake pathway are significant. In the most economic Core pathway, Poland will have 8.5 million passenger and 660,000 freight EVs by 2030. In the Slow Consumer Uptake pathway, only 1.9 million passenger and 220,000 freight EVs will be in Poland by 2030—a third to a quarter of the capacity of the Core pathway.</span></p>
<h4><span><strong>Figure 8: </strong>Transportation system costs across scenarios compared to Reference.</span></h4>
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<h4><span>To explore all of our results from NZP see below the full data Tableau.</span></h4>
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<h3><a href="https://carbonfreeeurope.imgix.net/Polands-Pathways-to-Net-Zero-Emissions.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Click here to view the full PDF. </a></h3>

Poland’s Pathways to Net-Zero Emissions

<p><span>On February 6, 2024 the European Commission </span><a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_588" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span>announced</span></a><span> that it would recommend a 90% greenhouse gas emissions reduction by 2040. Carbon-Free Europe’s (CFE) energy systems </span><a href="https://www.carbonfreeeurope.org/modelling" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span>modelling</span></a><span> points to what steps and transformative investments the EU must make to reach its 2040 climate targets, as visualised in the infographic below. <a href="https://assets.ctfassets.net/228txxvb8tt7/2YhvvGthkBrF4O26Xuc1PV/0a4a15adfddf512200d6d11f247153ee/vision_to_reality_negative_90_percent.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Click here to view the full PDF. </a></span></p>
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Infographic: How The EU Can Achieve -90% Emissions by 2040

Net-Zero Unveiled: UK's Ambitions Analysed

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<h2>Takeaways</h2>
<ul class="boldList">
<li>
<strong>Powering Up the Power Sector:</strong> Italy requires massive investment in and deployment of renewable electricity capacity to move away from fossil fuel dependence. </li>
<li>
<strong>Building Public Support for Decarbonisation:</strong> Italy should involve a range of different actors, agencies, and community representatives in the decision-making process to ensure public acceptance.</li>
<li>
<strong>Bridging the Geographical Divide:</strong> Italy requires investment into domestic and cross-border T&amp;D and electricity storage infrastructure to ensure grid stability and security.</li>
<li>
<strong>Embracing Technology Inclusivity:</strong> Italy must expand its hydrogen supply chain and explore clean energy technology to ease transition for hard-to-electrify sectors. Italy will benefit from a diversified energy system that boosts resilience, security, independence from fossil fuels, and strategic autonomy.</li>
</ul>
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<h2>Introduction</h2>
<p>Within the next year, Italy will need to update its National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP) and long-term energy strategy to reflect the latest EU targets. Not only does Italy need to reach at least 55% emissions reduction by 2030, it also needs to meet specific targets established in the Fit-for-55 package and REPowerEU for deploying clean energy, reducing energy demand, and diversifying energy supplies.</p>
<p>Italy’s last NECP, published in December 2019, set a preliminary goal of a 33% reduction compared to 2005 GHG emissions by 2030.<sup>1</sup> While it is on track to meet this target, Italy will need to reshape its energy systems to keep pace with the more ambitious reductions linked to the EU’s binding targets.</p>
<p>The country’s energy mix still relies heavily on fossil fuels, comprising 83.4% of the energy supply and powering 63.5% of the country’s electricity.<sup>2</sup> Much of that fuel comes from Russia, which only increases the urgency to decarbonise to shake Italy free of its dependency on unreliable partners that yield energy as a geopolitical weapon. There is no one-size-fits-all strategy to achieve these ambitious emissions reduction and energy security targets. Italy, as with other member states, must chart a course to net zero that suits its needs and plays to national strengths.</p>
<p>Despite two strong motivators for decarbonisation—climate mitigation and energy security—Italy still faces significant roadblocks in its path to emissions abatement. The country’s bureaucratic processes and regulations, coupled with the challenges of maintaining popular support for emissions reductions, will challenge the country’s efforts to meet its goals. We have seen this playout over the past decade as renewable energy deployment has slowed significantly compared to years prior. The country also faces a mismatch between the locus of demand (northern Italy) and the locus of production, areas with the greatest potential for renewable generation (southern Italy).</p>
<p>In this memo, we confront these challenges head on and outline the changes needed to allow Italy to meet its emissions abatement goals, in the face of the country’s unique sociopolitical challenges. Our analysis highlights four key areas of improvement to help Italy meet its new, more ambitious climate targets:</p>
<ol>
<li>Powering Up the Power Sector</li>
<li>Building Public Support for Decarbonisation</li>
<li>Bridging the Geographical Divide</li>
<li>Embracing Technology Inclusivity</li>
</ol>
<h2>Methodology</h2>
<p>This memo is part of a broader study from Carbon-Free Europe (CFE) that models 12 potential pathways (5 scenarios and 7 sensitivities) for the EU and UK to achieve net zero emissions by 2050. This report includes an assessment of what it will take for Italy’s energy system to reach carbon-neutrality across three of the 12 potential pathways:</p>
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<strong>Core Pathway:</strong> This path allows countries to use all available clean energy technologies, in line with their national policies, and assumes high levels of energy efficiency and electrification. It is the most feasible, cost-effective path to net zero.</li>
<li>
<strong>Constrained Renewables Pathway:</strong> This pathway considers less available land for solar and onshore power than the Core Pathway because of siting, permitting, supply chain, or social constraints.</li>
<li>
<strong>High Hydrogen Pathway:</strong> This path assumes delayed efforts to electrify end-uses like vehicles and industrial processes as compared to the Core Pathway, increasing the demand for zero-carbon fuels to replace liquid fossil fuels.</li>
</ul>
<p>To learn more about the other pathways and our full 2023 analysis, please <a href="https://www.carbonfreeeurope.org/modelling" target="_blank" rel="noopener">click here</a>.</p>
<h2>Powering Up the Power Sector</h2>
<p>Our analysis identifies a gap between Italy’s current electricity generation and capacity, and what is needed to achieve net zero emissions by 2050. CFE’s model reveals that the most feasible path to net zero (known in our analysis as the ‘Core Pathway’) will require a fourfold increase in electricity capacity, bringing Italy’s total electricity capacity from 118 gigawatts (GW) today to 234 GW in 2030 and 456 GW in 2050. While overall primary energy consumption will decrease with energy efficiency improvements from 145 Mtoe in 2022<sup>3</sup> to 76 Mtoe by 2050 (Core Pathway), the increase in electricity demand is inevitable as Italy electrifies economic sectors such as industry, residential, and transport.</p>
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<p>In 2022, fossil fuels made up 50% of Italy’s electricity capacity.<sup>4</sup> To meet its climate goals, the country must reduce that figure to 18% by 2030 and 8% by 2050. This small amount of remaining fossil fuel capacity is maintained for reliability in extreme events. Italy can then deploy carbon capture and carbon sequestration technologies to counterbalance the remaining 8% fossil fuel-based electricity generation, or even run gas turbines with low carbon fuels like ammonia instead of fossil fuels.</p>
<p>These changes strike a delicate balance: Italy must dramatically increase electricity production, while, simultaneously, transforming how it generates electricity. Renewable proliferation is happening in Italy, but it will need to move faster than ever before to meet the country’s needs and climate goals. The country’s renewable energy supply needs to increase from the 59 GW capacity calculated in 2022 to 419 GW by 2050, according to our analysis.</p>
<p>In practice, which increase requires at least 18,300 additional onshore wind turbines, with an average power of 3MV and an additional 3,630 Photovoltaic (PV) farms with an 84 MW capacity. That means the country will need to build almost 4000 PV farms that match the output of the country’s second largest PV farm, the Montalto di Castro PV power station, which covers 166 hectares and has more than 275,000 operational solar modules.<sup>5</sup> It is no exaggeration to say that increasing renewable deployment to this scale will be a massive undertaking. Our analysis shows it will also require significant investment: constructing both solar and onshore wind is estimated to cost at least 282 and 93 billion Euro by 2050. To meet its goals, Italy will need to leverage public sector investment and regulatory signals to crowd in significant private sector investment.</p>
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<h2>Building Public Support for Decarbonisation</h2>
<p>Public support for clean energy technology plays a critical role in deployment, in particular for renewables like solar and on- and offshore wind. Without adequate support from individuals and civil society, projects can slow significantly or halt entirely, posing a major hurdle to the clean energy transition.</p>
<p>Building an additional 305 GW of solar and 55 GW of onshore wind requires large areas of land and roofs, perhaps prompting a “NIMBY” mentality (not in my backyard) that could prove difficult to overcome as the Italian government works to deploy additional energy resources.</p>
<p>Should the Italian government fail to build adequate public support for new projects on land, as indicated in our Constrained Renewables Pathway, Italy will need to rely on additional offshore wind development (20 GW) to replace solar and onshore wind and meet its climate goals. That shift in electricity capacity, from more onshore capacity in the Core Pathway to more offshore capacity in the Constrained Renewables Pathway, will make the energy transition much more expensive, requiring an additional 12 billion Euro investment by 2050.</p>
<p>To avoid this costly and politically untenable situation, the Italian government must involve a range of different actors, agencies, and community representatives in the decision-making process. Italy should work to build consensus that increased clean energy proliferation is good for Italy’s economy, community, and future wellbeing. Ensuring public acceptance and involvement is pivotal to reaching the 2050 targets. The Italian government should also consider more energy dense resources like nuclear energy which, despite their high upfront cost, have smaller land footprints while providing more and firm zero-carbon electricity capacity.</p>
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<h2>Bridging the Geographical Divide</h2>
<p>Italy has historically been an electricity import country. In 2022, Italy required 47.4 TWh of imports compared to 4.4 TWh of exports.<sup>6</sup> Demand for electricity is highest in Northern Italy with 58% of electricity consumption in 2022.<sup>7</sup> Italy’s North holds the bulk of the country's industrial activity, but solar and onshore wind capacity, which is modelled to provide 96% of the country’s electricity generation under the Core and High Hydrogen pathway, are concentrated in the south-eastern region and in Sicily and Sardegna. This mismatch makes it hard for the north of Italy to obtain the energy it needs and makes it harder to obtain public support in regions where ambitious renewable deployment efforts are instead required.</p>
<p>The practical challenge inherit in this geographical mismatch will require substantial investment in domestic and cross-country transmission and distribution (T&amp;D) infrastructure. Terna announced a 21 billion Euro domestic T&amp;D investment by 2033.<sup>8</sup> In addition, our Core pathway models cross-country transmission investments of 2 billion Euro by 2030, like Terna’s development plan, and 4 billion Euro by 2050 to expand grid capacity to Tunisia, Greece, Austria, France, Slovenia, and Switzerland. In addition, due to the power intermittency and solar dependence (solar share will need to be 79% of electricity composition by 2050 according to our Core Pathway) Italy will have to invest at least 78 billion Euro into cost-effective electricity storage solutions with a capacity of at least 64 GW, dwarfing the current 3 GW of storage capacity.</p>
<h2>Embracing Technology Inclusivity</h2>
<p>Renewable technologies are the key power resource to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and they are essential to meeting net zero targets. Reaching carbon neutrality and ensuring stability in the energy system with a purely renewable approach is significantly harder than an approach that uses a broader diversity of clean energy technologies. Italy is already relying on significant amounts of electricity imports. Dependency on purely intermittent electricity capacity may create bottlenecks at cross-country transmission. Deploying a broad array of energy sources helps ensure the energy system is strong, resilient to change, and secure. A renewables-only approach is more land-intensive and less resilient than an energy sector that deploys a broader range of clean energy technologies including nuclear, clean hydrogen, and geothermal.</p>
<p>Nuclear energy is independent of weather resources. Advanced small modular reactors could be built in Italy’s North, where solar and onshore wind resources are lacking. Nuclear thus reduces transmission and distribution costs, uses less land,<sup>9</sup> provides highly efficient, concentrated, and firm electricity when intermittent power systems do not operate, and high temperature operations can be used for district heating and hydrogen production. Additionally, hard to electrify industrial processes that rely on high temperature heat could use nuclear power stations to meet their energy needs.</p>
<p>Clean hydrogen produced by nuclear-based high temperature electrolysis can provide fuel for hard-to-electrify transportation subsectors such as heavy-duty trucks or industrial work. Our Core Pathway suggests that by 2050 Italy could produce 40-50% more green hydrogen than it requires domestically, making Italy the third largest green hydrogen producer in the EU, enabling export, and providing a stable energy source for critical manufacturing.</p>
<p>Our High Hydrogen pathway, however, indicates that, should the country delay electrification, Italy will be required to produce even more hydrogen than illustrated in the Core Pathway in order to meet its domestic energy needs and provide essential hydrogen export to other European economies that have limited hydrogen production abilities. In this pathway, without nuclear power, Italy would require 38 GW of additional renewable electricity capacity to produce hydrogen for both domestic and trade needs to lower greenhouse gas emissions.</p>
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<p>The current insufficient funding via the National Hydrogen Strategy and the 450 million Euro State Aid by the EU Commission<sup>10</sup> is but barely a jumpstart compared to the costs our pathways predict. According to our Core and High Hydrogen pathways, the government needs to invest significantly higher funds to develop and shift its focus toward hydrogen as a clean energy technology, especially if electrification is delayed (High Hydrogen Pathway).</p>
<p>Incorporating a strong hydrogen supply chain using both renewable and nuclear power is an essential move that would ease the transition to net zero for hard-to-electrify sectors, while boosting the resilience of Italy’s energy system independent of delays. This clean technology inclusive approach can make Italy a clean energy leader that ensures European energy security, independence from Russian fossil fuels, and strengthens Italy’s strategic autonomy and role in Europe’s net zero ambitions.</p>
<h2>Conclusion</h2>
<p>Italy's decarbonization challenge is attainable. It requires a comprehensive shift in the power sector, led by a transition from fossil fuels to renewables, coupled with robust public support. Bridging geographical disparities will be essential and considering a clean technology-inclusive approach can ease Italy’s journey toward a decarbonised economy. This transformative path aligns with climate goals and provides greater energy security, economic resilience, and reduced dependence on intermittent electricity sources. Italy has an opportunity to lead by example in Europe's clean energy transition and ensure a sustainable and secure energy future.<a href="#_ednref1" name="_edn1"></a></p>

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