In anticipation of Poland’s submission of its updated National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP/KPEiK) to the European Commission in June 2024, Carbon-Free Europe (CFE) commissioned Evolved Energy Research, in collaboration with the Silesian University of Technology (SUT), the Institute of Power Engineering - National Research Institute, and Princeton University’s Andlinger Center, to conduct an extensive energy systems modelling study. The objective of the two-phase project is to delineate pathways for Poland to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050, thereby informing not only the NECP revision but also future policies, national strategies, and long-term investments.
The two-phase Net-Zero Poland (NZP) study provides a first-of-its-kind, detailed and transparent articulation of alternative pathways for Poland to transition to net-zero emissions by 2050. The study aims to inform energy-transition strategy, policy formulation, and investment decision making in both the public and private sectors. Below you can find the results of the first phase of the project, which was led by CFE and provides critical and data-based insights on a national and international level. The second phase, led by SUT, will use the data to run a higher spatial resolution model that enables key land-use, socio-technical, environmental, and investment challenges to be discussed at the voivodeship, powiat, and gminas level.
Poland’s energy landscape remains more heavily reliant on fossil fuels compared to other EU Member States. Because of this, Poland faces unique challenges to meet the EU’s ambitious emissions reduction targets under the Fit for 55 package, while ensuring coal regions are not left behind and energy prices remain affordable. The <a href="https://commission.europa.eu/publications/poland-draft-updated-necp-2021-2030_en" target="_blank" rel="noopener">NECP draft update</a> sets ambitious targets for Poland, aiming for a 29.8% share of renewable energy sources (RES) in gross final energy consumption by 2030 (compared to 9.4% in 2022).1
With a well-designed implementation strategy, Poland can achieve a just transition, zero-emission energy system, and improved air quality as outlined in the proposed <a href="https://www.gov.pl/web/climate/energy-policy-of-poland-until-2040-epp2040" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Energy Policy of Poland until 2040 (PEP2040)</a>. This strategy relies on a diverse energy mix to be successful, including accelerating renewable deployment alongside nuclear energy. 
Our analysis explored eight different pathways for Poland to reach net-zero, each of which has different cost implications and feasibility risks. In this report, we highlight results in six key areas: 1) achieving clean heat, 2) future of coal with carbon capture and storage, 3) role of nuclear energy, 4) renewable resource availability, 5) essential hydrogen interconnector, and 6) electric vehicles.
The full technical report can be found <a href="https://assets.ctfassets.net/228txxvb8tt7/2iDzvF9Di2nVrTywjEAdER/dbdcc3fbbd738d4abd902d190f4f1507/Poland_NECP_Analysis.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">here</a>. A full data Tableau with interactive results can be found at the end of this publication.
<h2>Achieving Clean Heat</h2>
Achieving a clean and decarbonised heating system for Poland requires two main strategies 1) replacing in-home coal and biomass boilers with heat pumps and 2) decarbonising steam supply for district heating and industry. Today, around 60% of residential buildings rely on coal or biomass boilers, 35% on district heating systems, and 5% on heat pumps. In our Core pathway, the percentage of homes with heat pumps needs to jump to 17% by 2030 and 45% by 2050. These heat pumps replace in-home coal and biomass boilers while district heating systems are preserved and decarbonised upstream. To achieve this goal, Poland requires a supply chain to install heat pumps in over 200,000 homes per year and more than quadruple electricity supply by 2050. 
Below you can see how steam for district heating, as well as industry, is decarbonised. Currently, steam is principally produced through coal power plants and boilers. The coal phaseout for steam production is achieved primarily through the deployment of large heat pumps, with some gasification in the short-term. Beyond 2030, nuclear facilities also play an important role in providing steam, providing up to 14% of supply.
<h4>Figure 1: Steam production across all modelled pathways.</h4>
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<h2>Future of Coal with Carbon Capture and Storage</h2>
Our pathway “High Coal w/ CCS” models what would happen if Poland were to keep coal in its energy economy system with up to 15 GW of coal capacity by 2050, equal to about 50% of the current fleet. We ran this pathway not to recommend preserving coal capacity, but to demonstrate the trade-offs in a strategy banking on carbon capture technology with coal or hoping to delay renewable deployment for future technology breakthroughs. As you can see in Figure 2, keeping coal creates a lower need for gas power compared to the Core pathway, but it does not negate the need for nuclear and renewables.
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Figure 2: Electricity capacity in the “Core” versus the “High Coal w/ CCS” pathway
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There are two potentially insurmountable challenges with the “High Coal w/ CCS” pathway: 1) costs and 2) carbon capture transport and storage infrastructure needs. A future bound to coal is the highest cost pathway and extremely expensive toward 2050 with at least 8.0 billion EUR more investments compared to our "Core" Pathway in the year of 2050 alone. It also requires over 100 megatons (Mt) of CO2 exports annually on top of an annual 20 Mt domestic CO2 sequestration and some domestic CO2 utilisation (Figure 3). Achieving these scales of operations for both sequestration and export requires careful planning. Expanding CO2 pipelines to Germany and other Central European countries as well as the Nordics is required in all pathways, but needs to be scaled up significantly in the case of keeping coal within the energy system.
Irrespective of the economics of CO2 pipelines and deployment of carbon capture, utilisation, and storage (CCUS) technology, Poland will need to adhere to the European Union’s Renewable Energy Directive (<a href="https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/renewable-energy/renewable-energy-directive-targets-and-rules/renewable-energy-directive_en" target="_blank" rel="noopener">RED III</a>) and account for ageing coal infrastructure that will need replacement regardless of climate targets.
<h4>Figure 3: Carbon capture sequestration in Poland, export, and utilisation.</h4>
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<h2>Role of Nuclear Energy</h2>
In all our model pathways nuclear energy plays a significant role in providing zero carbon electricity for the power sector as well as steam for industrial processes and district heating (see “Achieving Clean Heat”) and hydrogen production (see “Essential Hydrogen Interconnector”). We consider the potential of different sizes and types of reactors, including large light water reactors and advanced small modular reactors. 
In the power sector, nuclear energy provides 19 GW of electric capacity by 2050 in our “Core” pathway. With less nuclear deployment due to cost constraints, represented with our “High Nuclear Costs” pathway, Poland would need to deploy more than three times the capacity of alternative clean energy resources. Figure 4 shows that replacing 19 GW of nuclear energy requires building more than 70 GW of alternative resources including majority solar, offshore wind, gas, and storage. The total electric capacity needs to be higher to provide the same electricity generation, including an increased gas peaker capacity and more electric storage to balance the grid. 
<h4>Figure 4: Change in electricity capacity for the “High Nuclear Costs” pathways compared to “Core”</h4>
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Offshore wind power becomes especially important in any pathway with limited nuclear energy deployment as solar and onshore wind power are using almost all available resources (see Figure 6). As you can see in Figure 5, the technologies have an inverse deployment relationship. High nuclear cost increases offshore wind demand and vice versa as shown by the “High Offshore Wind Costs” pathway. Considering cost and subsequent deployment uncertainties, a flexible framework that incentivizes the buildout of both nuclear and offshore wind is necessary.
<h4>Figure 5: Electricity generation across all modelled scenarios.</h4>
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<h2>Renewable Resource Availability</h2>
The EU requires Poland to reach 42.5% renewables in final energy consumption by 2030, a target that Poland can reach considering wind and solar resource potential. In our analysis, we consider the potential of renewable resources based on land use availability, resource quality, and relative economics compared to other clean energy resources. Reaching this target for final energy consumption will require Poland to ramp up its current power sector target of 50% renewables by 2030 and the electrification of the transportation sector (see “Electric Vehicles”). Our pathways suggest Poland should achieve 60-66% renewables in the power sector by 2030 even while total electricity generation increases by 50% compared to 2022.
Below you can see the Wind and Solar Resource Potential for Poland (orange) and how much of the renewable resources are used in each pathway over time (blue) to meet the renewable energy share. Onshore wind is a valuable resource that is maxed out in all pathways by 2040, except in a pathway where we explicitly prevent additional onshore wind builds. The vast majority of fixed offshore wind resources are used up over time as well and most pathways are also tapping into more expensive floating offshore wind resources. If nuclear power is prevented due to high cost or if onshore wind cannot be deployed, both fixed and floating offshore wind resources are facing maximum use. Solar is deployed across all pathways and large-scale deployment is maxed out if nuclear deployment is limited.
<h4>Figure 6: Wind and solar resource potential.</h4>
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<h2>Essential Hydrogen Interconnector</h2>
Poland is currently the third largest hydrogen producer (1.3 Mt H2/year2) and consumer (0.8 Mt H2/year3) in Europe and fifth largest producer in the world. Building on this workforce and experience, Poland can establish a clean hydrogen industry that fulfils domestic hydrogen demand (a key priority for energy security) and interconnects and exports hydrogen from the Baltics to Germany and other nations in need. 
Figure 7 shows Poland’s domestic hydrogen production. Across all pathways, Poland can leverage its hydrogen experience, future nuclear and offshore power, and biomass resources to become a large-scale hydrogen producer. The “High Biomass” pathway sees the most hydrogen product due to expanded BECCS hydrogen and nuclear heat electrolysis potential.
Poland’s strategic location makes it an essential hydrogen interconnector for pipelines between the Baltics and Germany and other Central European countries. As shown in Figure 7, Poland can take hydrogen from the Baltics and domestic production, use it as a feedstock to produce e-fuels and ammonia, and export these alternative fuels. Fostering collaboration and strategic partnerships with neighbouring countries will create a cohesive regional hydrogen and alternative fuel network, leveraging an economic opportunity for Poland as a hydrogen interconnector.
<h4>Figure 7: Hydrogen supply and demand</h4>
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<h2>Electric Vehicles</h2>
Early and large-scale electrification, especially of the transportation sector, plays a vital role in the transition to a net-zero emissions economy. The difference between a short-term (“Core” pathway) and long-term electrification (“Slow Consumer Uptake” pathway) in transportation is a much higher price tag during a delayed transportation electrification. 
Below are the additional costs or savings by 2030 or 2050 compared to our Reference pathway that does not achieve net-zero emissions. On the one hand, slow electrification in transportation saves money in the near-term as no or little investments are made into electric vehicle infrastructure. On the other hand, slow electrification ends up costing significantly more money in the long-term because the system has little build-out of cost- and energy-efficient EV infrastructure and requires a higher dependency on expensive zero-emissions liquid fuels to achieve net-zero targets.
The electric vehicle deployment differences between the Core and Slow Consumer Uptake pathway are significant. In the most economic Core pathway, Poland will have 8.5 million passenger and 660,000 freight EVs by 2030. In the Slow Consumer Uptake pathway, only 1.9 million passenger and 220,000 freight EVs will be in Poland by 2030—a third to a quarter of the capacity of the Core pathway.
<h4>Figure 8: Transportation system costs across scenarios compared to Reference.</h4>
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<h4>To explore all of our results from NZP see below the full data Tableau.</h4>
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<h3><a href="https://carbonfreeeurope.imgix.net/Polands-Pathways-to-Net-Zero-Emissions.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Click here to view the full PDF. </a></h3>

Poland’s Pathways to Net-Zero Emissions

Beware of declarations that the recent European parliamentary elections offered a clear verdict on the continent’s politics. It was neither the endorsement of the far-right that many feared nor the validation of the status quo that would make governing easy for the next five years. The European People’s Party (EPP), which leads the current EU governing coalition and is the home of European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, remains in power. The agenda enacted over the past five years will remain in place. The results, however, are a cautionary tale. Policymakers and NGOs must quickly adapt to a future that could prove to be even more unstable than today’s economic and political turmoil.
Europe did dodge the bullet of a far-right sweep of the parliamentary elections. Voters across the Nordic countries, in much of Central and Eastern Europe, and on the Iberian peninsula backed mainstream parties. The news, however, was different in Europe’s three most populous and economically powerful countries, Germany, France, and Italy. There, far-right nationalist parties continued their march into the mainstream, offering a much more complex scenario for the future of Europe and the fate of clean energy and climate policy.  
The EU cannot maintain the status quo of how climate policy is formulated and communicated to voters. These policies, and how they are discussed, are alienating large groups of Europeans who feel left behind and disenfranchised. This is being exacerbated by populist extremists on both ideological fringes, particularly on the far-right. The question now is whether governments, political institutions, and NGO communities that have created Europe’s climate and clean energy agenda can adapt quickly enough to reassure Europeans and rebuff the far-right where it remains strong or is growing.
<h4>The Implications for the Next EU Parliament and Legislative Agenda</h4>
The conclusion of the European parliamentary election is only the start of the process of determining the next EU political leadership and ruling majority.  National delegations will now enter into negotiations to form the European political groups—large groupings of cross-national political families. While these negotiations are ongoing, the center-right EPP, which has secured the largest number of seats in parliament, is expected to solidify the ongoing majority coalition with the center-left Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&amp;D) and classic liberal Renew Europe. The far-right nationalist ID Party, and unaffiliated nationalist parties like Germany’s Alternative for Germany (AfD), will likely be excluded from the next government, though the European Conservative and Reformists (ECR) group may align with the EPP’s majority position on some issues. This balance of power in the Parliament will also determine the political leadership in other key EU institutions, including the appointment of the next European Commission President.
However the next EU government emerges, we expect the EU Parliament and Commission to follow only a slightly more center-right policy agenda than the current status quo. Current European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, who has been in office since 2019, is likely to receive a second term. This means continued implementation of the Green Deal, industrial competitiveness, and the EU climate commitments enacted since 2019 remain in place.
It is, however, an open question as to how much new legislation the next government can enact, especially with a potentially narrower majority. A more empowered set of far-right and nationalist parties could cause more disruption and attempt to slow policymaking down. Even here the far-right’s actions are unpredictable. These parties are fragmented. While most are aligned in opposition to migration and criticism of enacted climate action, they hold conflicting views on how to deal with Russia and China and where they fall regarding Euroscepticism. They could try to undermine Europe’s unity in support of Ukraine and the overall strengthening of the Union, but that path is far from certain. Issues like agriculture, biodiversity, and migration policy could become more tenuous, with coalition partnerships shifting based on the topic. This will lead to more tension, less predictability, and potentially more protracted negotiations over some files.
<h4>National Influence of the European Election</h4>
We should also look at the results of the EU elections from a Member State by Member State perspective. Contrary to many headlines, there was not a far-right wave across the continent. Results can be divided into two camps. The far-right gained or reinforced their support in Europe’s three largest countries, Germany, France, and Italy. It failed to live up to expectations almost everywhere else, notably in Spain, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Sweden, and even Hungary.
The biggest takeaway from Germany, France, and Italy is the normalizing of the far-right. The AfD in Germany, the National Rally in France, and the Brothers of Italy all trace their roots to World War II-era fascist parties. Until Brothers of Italy leader Giorgia Meloni became Italian Prime Minister in October 2022, none had ever gained power.  During this election, France’s National Rally outperformed every other party, prompting President Emmanuel Macron to call a snap election for June 20 and July 7. If the National Rally emerges as the strongest party in France in these snap elections, yet another major European economy falls under the influence of the far-right. At the EU level, these three national far-right parties are not fully aligned and have not yet agreed to cooperate, with Meloni and the Brothers of Italy supporting Ukraine and the European Union, while AfD and National Rally are suspiciously pro-Russia.
Across the rest of Europe, there were a variety of national factors that led to the underperformance of the far-right. We shouldn’t read too much into the overall results and try to find pan-European trends. However, it is interesting to note that in several countries—Poland and Hungary in particular—incumbent or recently defeated far-right parties lost ground. This is in keeping with the global anti-incumbent mood among voters.  The combination of the mainstreaming of the far-right and general anti-incumbency sentiment will only make policymaking and navigating European politics more difficult.
<h4>Lessons for Policymaking and Framing</h4>
The broader challenge facing policymakers, political parties, and NGOs is how to interpret these results. There is a danger in viewing it as an endorsement of the past five years’ policies and framing of issues. Persistent voter discontent, a growing anti-incumbent backlash, and the mainstreaming of far-right nationalist parties point to systemic risk. The pace and the volume of legislation cannot continue in the next five years. Nor can it be oriented or framed around issues that many European voters feel are out of touch with, or negatively impact, their daily lives. The new EU leadership, and NGOs that support them, must be explicit about how the Green Deal’s implementation will help improve the lives of everyday Europeans, support industry and agriculture in the EU, and reduce costs.
Reframing the actions the EU has taken over the past five years, justifiably, around improving the continent’s security and competitiveness is an important start to addressing Europeans’ concerns. The next step is to use these policies to enable each Member State to take the actions that will accelerate decarbonization, and address the economic and security issues front and center in their citizens’ minds. If these policies, however, limit or are cast by the populist Right as limiting Europeans’ choices or increasing their costs in the name of “climate action,” the chance of creating an even greater backlash is significant.
<h4>Conclusion</h4>
It is still too early to form firm conclusions on the full impact of the EU elections, and the results were too varied to apply generalizations to the entire Union. Moving forward, members of the climate and energy community must acknowledge that a change of approach is needed in the new mandate to ensure the durability of the net-zero transition. Continuing to engage in technical support for policy implementation and highlighting the need for Transatlantic cooperation on these, ultimately global, issues is important. It is even more critical now to acknowledge and address voter discontent, which is also being exploited by the far-right. There is an opportunity here to build on some of the synergies across US and EU audiences to engage citizens who feel uneasy with the changes occurring, or more insecure because of the cost of living and security crises, and incorporate their concerns in building a broader vision for climate action that is centered around competitiveness, energy security, transatlantic cooperation, and democracy.

EU Election: Short-Term Relief, but Long-Term Threat from the Far Right

Net-Zero Unveiled: UK's Ambitions Analysed

Lindsey Walter

General Contact

About Us

The European Union’s ambitious hydrogen targets are central to its strategy for achieving net-zero emissions by 2050, with hydrogen positioned to decarbonise hard-to-abate sectors like industry and transport. In 2022, the <a href="https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal/repowereu-affordable-secure-and-sustainable-energy-europe_en" target="_blank" rel="noopener">REPowerEU</a> set strategic goals to produce 10 million tonnes of renewable hydrogen domestically and import another 10 million tonnes by 2030. By 2050, hydrogen is expected to supply around 10% of the EU’s energy needs.
Yet, the <a href="https://hydrogeneurope.eu/hydrogen-is-key-building-block-2040-targets/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">European Commission’s current impact assessment</a> projects only 3 million tonnes of hydrogen by 2030—far below the 10 million tonne target. This gap highlights a mismatch between the scale of the EU's ambitions and the capacities of its current policy. To scale hydrogen production, the EU must surpass tremendous technological, economic, and regulatory barriers—it should not come as a surprise that the <a href="https://www.eca.europa.eu/en/publications/SR-2024-11" target="_blank" rel="noopener">European Court of Auditors</a> has called for a "reality check,” noting concerns about whether sufficient demand can support such large volumes of hydrogen.
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Our <a href="https://www.carbonfreeeurope.org/modelling" target="_blank" rel="noopener">2024 Annual Decarbonisation Perspective</a>—which maps Europe’s various pathways to net-zero— suggests that Europe’s domestic clean hydrogen supply and demand could reach 20-22 million tonnes by 2050 (see Figure 1), around 4-5% of final energy consumption (see Figure 2), which is below the 10% projected by <a href="https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal/repowereu-affordable-secure-and-sustainable-energy-europe_en" target="_blank" rel="noopener">REPowerEU</a>. 
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The central focus of these metrics should be to achieve EU decarbonisation through a balanced energy system. Rapidly scaling up hydrogen production, especially green hydrogen, which demands significant renewable energy, could divert resources from sectors where direct electrification is more efficient. A pragmatic strategy would prioritise hydrogen for hard-to-decarbonise sectors, like shipping and aviation, while reserving direct electrification for heating and other applications where it’s more effective. 
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<h2>Recommendations: </h2>
Flexible PPAs: Implement PPAs for diverse low-carbon sources, ensuring a stable energy supply to support hydrogen production at scale.
Funding Mechanisms: The new EU budget should enable these funds (or these new fund structures) to address critical needs:
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The <a href="https://climate.ec.europa.eu/eu-action/eu-funding-climate-action/innovation-fund_en" target="_blank" rel="noopener">European Innovation Fund</a> can support hydrogen infrastructure and storage projects.
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<a href="https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/funding/funding-opportunities/funding-programmes-and-open-calls/horizon-europe_en" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Horizon Europe</a> can advance hydrogen R&amp;D, fostering innovation across the supply chain.
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The <a href="https://cinea.ec.europa.eu/programmes/connecting-europe-facility_en" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Connecting Europe Facility</a> can fund crucial grid upgrades and interconnections needed to integrate hydrogen production and demand.
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So while the EU may face challenges in meeting its ambitious 2030 hydrogen targets, this should not deter long-term planning. The 2040 hydrogen goals remain attainable with a pragmatic, balanced approach to decarbonisation and a flexible, adaptive strategy. This should involve setting clear intermediate milestones and regularly assessing infrastructure readiness, technological progress, and supply chain integration.
<h2>Expanding Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) and Diversifying Energy Sources</h2>
To fully unlock hydrogen’s potential, immediate action is needed to address infrastructure gaps including electrolyser manufacturing and deployment, regulatory challenges, and the diversity of energy sources. Relying solely on renewables for hydrogen production could limit scalability and stability, while incorporating a wider array of low-carbon sources—such as nuclear via Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs)—will ensure a reliable hydrogen supply that can adapt to demand growth.
<h2>Leveraging EU Funding Mechanisms for a Resilient Supply Chain</h2>
Leveraging EU funding mechanisms such as the <a href="https://climate.ec.europa.eu/eu-action/eu-funding-climate-action/innovation-fund_en" target="_blank" rel="noopener">European Innovation Fund</a>, <a href="https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/funding/funding-opportunities/funding-programmes-and-open-calls/horizon-europe_en" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Horizon Europe</a>, and the <a href="https://cinea.ec.europa.eu/programmes/connecting-europe-facility_en" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Connecting Europe Facility</a> is crucial to support hydrogen infrastructure, R&amp;D, and necessary grid upgrades. These funds can drive essential investments to scale hydrogen production while supporting technological advances across the value chain. With targeted funding for both deployment and infrastructure, the EU can ensure a resilient hydrogen supply that aligns with its climate and energy security goals. The new EU budget should ensure these funding mechanisms are accessible and the process is as streamlined as possible. 
<h2>Supporting a Full Hydrogen Supply Chain through Hydrogen Valleys</h2>
The <a href="https://www.clean-hydrogen.europa.eu/get-involved/hydrogen-valleys_en" target="_blank" rel="noopener">EU’s Hydrogen Valleys</a> offer a whole-systems approach, integrating hydrogen production, storage, and usage across local economies. Supported by initiatives like the <a href="https://www.clean-hydrogen.europa.eu/index_en" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Clean Hydrogen Partnership</a>, these Hydrogen Valleys demonstrate hydrogen’s scalability and its role in building a skilled, competitive workforce for Europe. Projects in regions like the <a href="https://heavenn.org/about/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Northern Netherlands</a> and <a href="https://www.moeveglobal.com/en/press/spain-and-the-netherlands-promote-the-green-hydrogen-maritime-corridor" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Spain’s Hydrogen Corridor</a> are essential for meeting both EU competitiveness and net-zero goals.
<h2>Conclusion</h2>
To achieve the EU's decarbonisation goals and enhance competitiveness, prioritising hydrogen for hard-to-decarbonise sectors while ensuring a balanced use of renewable resources is crucial. By investing now in Hydrogen Valleys, accelerating market creation for hydrogen and an inclusive framework, the EU can establish a resilient hydrogen economy, enhancing energy security and decarbonisation efforts across the continent.

Turning a 2030 Shortfall into a 2040 Win: The Case for Flexible Hydrogen Policy

Florian A. Schneider, PhD.

Senior Research Advisor

Kashvi Chandok

Climate and Energy Fellow

2040 win HG

Memo

Carbon-Free Europe (CFE) welcomes the European Commission’s continued work on developing a robust methodology for assessing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions savings from low-carbon fuels. However, excluding key low-carbon energy sources from this process risks diminishing the role hydrogen can play in the energy transition, and more broadly slowing the transition overall . To fully realise the true potential of low-carbon hydrogen production, it is critical that the methodology takes into account the role of these key low-carbon energy sources in hydrogen electrolysis, such as nuclear power, particularly through Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) and Contracts for Differences (CfDs).
One of the key issues with the current draft is the reliance on the bidding region/national average emissions intensities when calculating the GHG emissions associated with electricity used for hydrogen production. This approach risks distorting the actual environmental impact of hydrogen production by failing to reflect the specific energy mix used in real-time. In particular, averaging emissions at the country level can obscure the contributions of clean energy sources like nuclear power, which may supply low-carbon electricity during times when renewable generation is unavailable or insufficient. Such a distortion toward a resource with significantly growing demand in the coming decades could significantly impact its supply and thus any energy transition opportunities related to it.
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CFE’s energy systems modelling shows that clean hydrogen demand will grow 50x, with 4-5% of total final energy consumption by 2050 (see Figure 1). With that contribution, clean hydrogen has the potential to play a transformative role in decarbonising hard-to-abate sectors such as heavy industry and long-haul transport. However, the type of hydrogen supply—whether through steam reforming (grey hydrogen) or electrolysis (green/clean hydrogen)—makes a critical difference for emissions purposes. Our model foresees the use of grey hydrogen until 2045 (see Figure 2), and with that GHG emissions in the production of hydrogen. But to accelerate the transition to hydrogen produced via electrolysis, we must ensure the availability of sufficient clean electricity. This requires a commitment to supporting diverse low-carbon electricity sources, including nuclear, through mechanisms like PPAs. Electricity demand is growing everywhere and at a rapid pace, as the need to decarbonise our economy accelerates. Hence, the regulatory framework should reflect a pragmatic approach where all viable low-carbon energy sources are at our disposal. Doing otherwise significantly increases delivery risk as the EU prepares  for a tripling of electricity demand across all sources (see Figure 3). 
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Additionally, excluding nuclear PPAs from the Delegated Act risks underestimating the contribution that nuclear power can make to the energy system. Nuclear energy provides a low-emissions, stable electricity source that can complement renewable generation, especially during periods of low renewable output. The current methodology misrepresents the true emissions reductions that nuclear power can achieve in low-carbon hydrogen production. To prevent an unfair penalty toward low-carbon hydrogen producers, and to fully account for the actual source of electricity, and secure the energy system, nuclear PPAs should be included in the low-carbon hydrogen definition before 2028.
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Finally, to ensure that the EU’s hydrogen strategy is both effective and equitable, it is essential that the methodology for assessing GHG emissions savings represents a truly technology neutral approach that relies on all viable technologies. The EU’s climate targets and its broader decarbonisation strategy will require the scaling of multiple clean energy technologies in tandem (see Figure 2), and focusing solely on renewables for low-carbon fuels narrows the path to decarbonisation. By including nuclear PPAs in the low-carbon hydrogen definition and the emissions calculation framework, the EU can better support scaling of low-carbon fuels and ensure a competitive, secure, and cost-effective transition to net-zero.
Given the urgent need to meet the EU’s decarbonisation objectives, there is no time to delay the inclusion of nuclear PPAs in the current methodology. Long-term planning and significant investments are needed for nuclear facilities, so the sooner these PPAs are in place, the more effectively the EU can scale up hydrogen production. By acting now, the EU can ensure that the infrastructure and energy sources needed for hydrogen production are aligned with its long-term climate and energy security goals.
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<h2>Reccommendations for Adjusting the Delegated Act</h2>
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Explicit Inclusion of Nuclear PPAs: The Delegated Act should explicitly include nuclear PPAs for low-carbon hydrogen production, as nuclear power provides stable, low-emissions electricity that complements renewable energy.
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Technology-Neutral Approach: Ensure that all low-carbon energy sources, including nuclear, are recognised in the emissions calculation methodology, encouraging flexibility in achieving net-zero and enhancing energy security.
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Shift to Source-Specific Emissions: Move away from using national average emissions for hydrogen production, and instead, account for the actual electricity source to provide a more accurate and fair reflection of GHG savings.
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Incorporating these recommendations would reflect the full spectrum of low-carbon energy options available. CFE emphasises the importance of including nuclear PPAs and adopting a technology neutral approach. By doing so, the EU can better support electricity growth and hydrogen production while maintaining its competitiveness in the global energy transition.

Ensuring Accurate Accounting for Low-Carbon Hydrogen Production through Nuclear Power PPAs

Kelsey Paulding

EU Government Affairs Director

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Blog

Ben Haley

Co-Founder, Evolved Energy Research

Katie Pickrell

Principal, Evolved Energy Research

Ryan Jones

Josh Freed

Co-founder of Carbon-Free Europe

Catherine Grossman

Special Advisor

Isabelle Chan

Non-Resident Fellow

Kelsey Murlless

Kelsey-Murlless

Former Climate & Energy Fellow, Third Way

Poland explainer HG

Full Technical Report: Poland NECP Analysis

As part of implementing the emissions reduction targets outlined in the European Green Deal, Romania has adopted its Long-Term Strategy (LTS) for Decarbonisation until 2050 and is currently revising its National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP). To support Romania in finalising these strategies, Carbon-Free Europe (CFE), in partnership with <a href="https://www.evolved.energy/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Evolved Energy Research</a> and the <a href="https://www.enpg.ro/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Energy Policy Group</a> (EPG), have developed a detailed energy systems model to outline clear steps Romania can take to hit its 2030, 2040, and 2050 climate targets while driving economic growth.
This analysis explores multiple decarbonisation pathways for Romania, considering combinations of all carbon-free technologies and policies that can guide Romania towards climate neutrality. The study highlights key measures for policymakers and broader stakeholders  to consider  including expanding clean energy capacities, electrifying key sectors, reducing final energy consumption, and limiting natural gas investments.
Romania’s energy landscape is currently characterised by its reliance on coal and natural gas, making the transition to clean energy a complex challenge. To meet the EU’s ambitious climate targets, including a 55% reduction in net greenhouse gas emissions by 2030, the country will need to accelerate its shift to clean energy, increase energy efficiency, and invest in new technologies such as carbon capture and storage (CCS) and hydrogen. Deploying and expanding CCS and hydrogen infrastructure by 2030 and beyond will play a critical role in decarbonising Romania’s industry and ensuring energy security. 
With the right combination of clean technologies and policies, Romania can not only decarbonise its economy in line with the EU’s net-zero commitments, but ensure continued economic growth and durable energy security. This study provides Romania with insights into realistic pathways to meet climate targets, offering clear, data-driven scenarios. For more detailed analysis, click here for the full <a title="https://www.enpg.ro/pathways-for-decarbonising-romanias-economy/" href="https://www.enpg.ro/pathways-for-decarbonising-romanias-economy/" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-ogsc="" data-outlook-id="142b919b-4b27-4048-8d5c-f760c69ebcdb">policy paper</a>, and deep dives on <a title="https://www.enpg.ro/the-role-of-carbon-capture-in-romanias-low-carbon-economy/" href="https://www.enpg.ro/the-role-of-carbon-capture-in-romanias-low-carbon-economy/" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-ogsc="" data-outlook-id="68691cad-f839-478a-b7f9-ca423556cb10">CCS</a> and <a title="https://www.enpg.ro/the-role-of-hydrogen-in-romanias-low-carbon-economy/" href="https://www.enpg.ro/the-role-of-hydrogen-in-romanias-low-carbon-economy/" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-ogsc="" data-outlook-id="57661c73-23fc-43af-90e6-9b161b60cbe9">hydrogen</a>.
To explore all of our results, see below the full data Tableau.
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Pathways for Decarbonising Romania’s Economy

Energy Policy Group

Romania HG

On 25th September 2024, Carbon-Free Europe (CFE) hosted our third flagship event in  Brussels, bringing together policymakers, energy experts, civil society and industry  leaders to exchange views on how the EU can balance its decarbonisation efforts with maintaining economic competitiveness.
Following opening words from Carbon-Free Europe co-founder, Lindsey Walter, we were delighted to be joined for keynote remarks by Yvon Slingenberg, Director for Strategy, Analysis and Planning at the European Commission’s DG CLIMA. Ms Slingenberg stressed the need for Europe to remain committed to its emissions reduction goals outlined in the European Green Deal and highlighted the need for increased support from policymakers on the implementation of the Fit for 55 legislation and close cooperation with Member States to update their National Climate and Energy Plans (NECPs). Looking to the new mandate, one of DG CLIMA’s main priorities will be the negotiation and finalisation of the EU’s 2040 climate target.  
Next, Kelsey Paulding, EU Director for Carbon-Free Europe, moderated a fireside chat focused on EU-level efforts to boost competitiveness with Łukasz Koliński, Acting Director for Green Transition and Energy System Integration at the European Commission’s DG ENER, and Philipp Offenberg, Director of Europe at Breakthrough Energy. Both speakers welcomed the progress made in the last mandate particularly on boosting deployment of renewables, and finalising a new electricity market design framework. In the coming five years, speakers stressed the need for the new EU Commission to pair regulatory measures on decarbonisation with complimentary initiatives to support implementation, address energy costs, and boost EU competitiveness. Discussion also focused on the need for transatlantic cooperation on clean tech to bolster economic growth and energy security.
The second panel discussion focused on how Member States can leverage their own resources and economies to pursue their best path to a secure, affordable, clean energy future Kira Taylor, Climate and Energy Reporter, moderated the insightful discussion between Albéric Mongrenier, Executive Director of the European Initiative for Energy Security, Tamara Lagurashvili, Director for Central and Eastern Europe at Clean Air Task Force, and Ben Haley, Co-Founder of Evolved Energy Research. Notably, panelists highlighted the need to shift political focus from the costs of the energy transition to the benefits and opportunities it presents, while also emphasising the importance of a flexible approach which allows Member States to choose the best strategies and technologies to meet emissions reduction targets.
The event also marked the release of our third annual energy systems analysis for Europe, conducted in partnership with Evolved Energy Research. This <a href="https://www.carbonfreeeurope.org/modelling" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Annual Decarbonisation Perspective</a> is a valuable tool for stakeholders seeking to understand trade-offs of different strategies to reach net-zero emissions by 2050. 
Several key findings from this year’s study were highlighted during the discussion including what clean energy technologies need to be deployed and when, the investments and infrastructure needed to support these technologies, and the importance of having a flexible EU policy framework that empowers Member States to stay on track to reach emissions reduction targets. You can find more details on these topics in our full report. 
View the full recording of the event <a href="https://youtu.be/Lz5ppkdXCos" target="_blank" rel="noopener">here</a>.
<a title="How Can Europe Be Competitive in a Net-Zero Economy?" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/196527949@N05/albums/72177720320985618" data-flickr-embed="true"><img src="https://live.staticflickr.com/65535/54049611257_7fdfb2e256_z.jpg" alt="How Can Europe Be Competitive in a Net-Zero Economy?" width="640" height="480"></a>

ADP 2024 HG

(How) Can Europe Be Competitive in a Net-Zero Economy?

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Bulgaria

Belgium

Croatia

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Interactive Results

Annual Decarbonisation Perspective 2024

View ADP Slide Deck

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Read Technical Documentation

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Read Full Report

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Download Data Input Catalog

Catherine-Grossman

Carbon-Free Europe Releases New Report Showing Clean Energy Infrastructure Needed Across Member States to Reach Net Zero

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Annual Decarbonisation Perspective 2023

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The US Approach to Clean Energy Industrial Strategy cover blue

Report

Carbon-Free Europe and Third Way’s Climate and Energy Program co-hosted a dynamic workshop on clean energy industrial strategy last week. Convening under Chatham House rules, the organisations led a diverse group of stakeholders from finance, government, industry, and the nonprofit world in a discussion on the future of industrial strategy in the US and abroad. The conversation focused on opportunities for collaboration between the private and public sectors to strengthen and sustain a clean energy industrial strategy and enhance transatlantic cooperation across various clean energy technologies.
The discussion underscored the need for both Europe and the US to balance dual priorities: efficient domestic decarbonisation and global decarbonisation efforts. Participants outlined the importance of aligning priorities, regulations, and standards to streamline international cooperation, amplify market power, reduce risk, make impactful joint investments, and boost collective global competitiveness. Working together, Europe and the US can strengthen a Clean Transatlantic Marketplace that will accelerate the deployment of clean technologies, boost economies, and counter authoritarian states that use energy as a tool to undermine democracy.

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Carbon-Free Europe, Third Way Convene Workshop on Transatlantic Clean Energy Industrial Strategy

Emily Becker

Sarah-Cronin

sarah-c

Sarah Cronin

Former Senior Press Advisor

Carbon-Free Europe, Partners Release Modelling Study on Poland’s Pathway to Net-Zero 

CFE Statement: NZIA will help Boost Investments in Manufacturing Carbon-Free Technologies

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Carbon-Free Europe (CFE) recently convened global nuclear stakeholders at COP28 for its Nuclear for Net Zero Night, in collaboration with the Atlantic Council and Clean Air Task Force. The event strengthened relationships among some of the world’s foremost nuclear policy experts and stakeholders and offered attendees a closer look at CFE’s <a href="https://www.carbonfreeeurope.org/modelling/Carbon-Free-Europe-Annual-Decarbonization-Perspective-2023.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">2023 Annual Decarbonisation Perspective</a>.
The evening served as a precursor to the World Nuclear Association’s offsite <a href="https://netzeronuclear.org/events/net-zero-nuclear-summit-2023" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Net Zero Nuclear Summit</a>, where CFE co-founder Lindsey Walter moderated a panel on unlocking financing barriers and expanding customer bases for nuclear energy. The panel includedPresident of China National Nuclear Power, Zou Zhengyu; COO of Emirates Steel Arkan, Hassan Salim Shashaa; and Idaho National Laboratory Director of Integrated Energy &amp; Storage Systems, Shannon Bragg-Sitton. 
<a title="CFE’s Net Zero for Nuclear Night at COP28" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/196527949@N05/albums/72177720317403585/" data-flickr-embed="true"><img src="https://live.staticflickr.com/65535/53408884285_00babba385.jpg" alt="CFE’s Net Zero for Nuclear Night at COP28" width="640" height="480"></a>
Carbon-Free Europe engaged with an array of clean energy leaders throughout COP28, here’s a closer look at some of those conversations:
<ul>
<li>CFE co-founder Lindsey Walter spoke on the IAEA Atoms4Climate Blue Zone Pavilion panel Taking Stock of Nuclear Energy’s Role in Climate Action alongside African Commission on Nuclear Energy (AFCONE) Executive Secretary, Mr. Enobot Agboraw, State Secretary to the Swedish Minister for Climate and the Environment, Daniel Westlén, and Founding Director of Terrapraxis, Kirsty Gogan. She spoke about nuclear energy’s treatment in the IPCC Sixth Assessment Report and first Global Stocktake and the risks of leaving nuclear out of climate planning strategies. 
</li>
<li>Lindsey also participated in a private roundtable at the Global Decarbonization Accelerator Pavilion, titled Women and the Clean Energy Transition and hosted by the Business Council for Sustainable Energy in partnership with the US Department of Commerce and Atlantic Council. Participants discussed driving thought leadership and gender considerations in project development and financing. The event was moderated by Lauren Hughes, Deputy Director of the Atlantic Council’s Nuclear Energy Policy Initiative, with participation from Marisa Lago, Under Secretary of Commerce for International Trade. 
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<li>Lindsey attended the Climate Leadership Council’s dinner and roundtable on clean energy trade and opportunities to build a clean transatlantic marketplace. The convening featured opening remarks from Anthony Agotha, Special Envoy for Climate and Environment Diplomacy for the European External Action Service and former member of Frans Timmermans cabinet leading on transatlantic relations. 
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<li>Lindsey spoke on the Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation and World Nuclear Association's Net Zero Nuclear Export Financing Green Zone Panel, which was specifically designed to highlight Third Way’s recommendations on export finance. She was joined by Omar Ben Halim from the US International Development Finance Corporation, who emphasized the importance of development finance and export credit agencies in supporting nuclear projects. 
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<li>Lindsey moderated a panel, Building Social License for Nuclear, in the Net Zero Nuclear Blue Zone Pavilion with the President Elect of the American Nuclear Society, Lisa Marshall, and Executive VP of AtkinsRealis Nuclear Canada, Gary Rose. They discussed best practices for community engagement for new nuclear projects. 
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<li>Lindsey moderated a panel, Youth and Sweden’s New Nuclear Roadmap, with the State Secretary to the Swedish Minister for Climate and the Environment, Daniel Westlén, and two youth advocates for nuclear energy. They broke down Sweden’s newly released plans to build two large nuclear reactors by 2035 and 10 others by 2045, and discussed the role of young climate activists in changing Sweden’s historic anti-nuclear stance. It wasn’t that long ago in 1980 when Sweden planned to phase out all nuclear energy, but this new nuclear roadmap is the latest in a series of wins for nuclear power in Sweden.</li>
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COP28 CFE HG

CFE’s Net Zero for Nuclear Night at COP28

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Last year, Carbon-Free Europe released energy systems modelling, which identified five different pathways for the EU and UK to reach their 2050 net-zero emissions commitments. Starting in 2023, CFE will update our analysis annually to capture the changing energy and policy landscapes. This year’s modelling includes the Fit for 55 package, as well as new decarbonisation goals from REPowerEU, the Hydrogen strategy, and more. We released this 2023 modelling report during our Net-Zero Outlook event on 7 June in Brussels.
We heard from CFE’s founding leadership, keynote speakers, researchers, and policy experts. The event included a panel on this year’s policy theme: Scaling Clean Energy Innovation and Investments to Enhance Competitiveness. Following this panel and closing remarks, we enjoyed a night at the museum cocktail reception, where guests networked and leisurely browsed the exhibits.
<a href="https://www.carbonfreeeurope.org/product/Carbon-Free-Europes-Annual-Decarbonisation-Perspective-2023" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Click here to view highlights from the event. </a>
<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0ahBf-6NIk0&amp;t=1s" target="_blank" rel="noopener">View the full recording of the event here.</a>
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Carbon-Free Europe's Annual Decarbonisation Perspective 2023

The EU-US Trade and Technology Council (TTC) held its first stakeholder dialogue of 2024 in Washington, DC in January to discuss the creation of a Green Transatlantic Marketplace. This convening <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/01/31/readout-of-u-s-eu-trade-and-technology-council-fifth-ministerial-meeting/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">included discussions</a> with global leaders on strengthening the transatlantic marketplace to support net-zero economies in the US and EU.
Amid ongoing talks at the TTC, Carbon-Free Europe (CFE), Third Way, and Breakthrough Energy convened clean energy leaders for a panel discussion on opportunities for the US and EU to support the TTC’s efforts to fully integrate a climate and trade market and  support the swift deployment of clean energy technologies.
One of the United States Senate’s foremost clean energy leaders Senator Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI) opened the discussion with remarks on the urgency of leveraging the US and EU’s relationship to bolster clean energy trade and cooperation. The conversation continued with a panel on how the EU and the US can strengthen international cooperation to deploy clean energy technologies, led by EU MEP Lidia Pereira, Heather Evans of the International Trade Administration, Marco Margheri of Eni, and Catrina Rorke of the Climate Leadership Council.
<a title="CFE Convenes Climate and Trade Leaders for Green Transatlantic Marketplace Discussion" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/196527949@N05/albums/72177720317419779" data-flickr-embed="true"><img src="https://live.staticflickr.com/65535/53610873318_f3486d35b0_z.jpg" alt="CFE Convenes Climate and Trade Leaders for Green Transatlantic Marketplace Discussion" width="640" height="480"></a>

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Carbon-Free Europe Convenes Climate & Trade Leaders for Green Transatlantic Marketplace Discussion

Carbon-Free Europe (CFE), in partnership with the Polish Ministry of Climate and Environment and the Silesian University of Technology (SUT), convened Polish clean energy economy stakeholders in Warsaw on 15 May, 2024 to examine new modelling on Poland’s net-zero pathways and the updated National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP). 
Anna Madyniak, Head of Energy Policy Unit, Department of Strategy and Analysis of the Ministry of Climate and Environment presented the status of Poland’s NECP update. Lindsey Walter, co-founder of CFE, then presented the results of the Poland modelling, including findings on clean heat, coal and carbon capture utilisation and storage (CCUS), nuclear energy, renewable resource availability, clean hydrogen, and electric vehicles.
CFE, SUT, and the Ministry then held an open dialogue with attendees from across government, academia, and industry to further identify key aspects and potential pathways that Poland must consider on its path to net-zero.
<h4>Net-Zero Poland Modelling Analysis</h4>
Ahead of Poland’s NECP submission to the European Commission, CFE, SUT, the Institute of Power Engineering, Princeton University’s Andlinger Center, and Evolved Energy Research performed an energy systems modelling study to identify pathways for Poland to net-zero emissions by 2050. This study offers key insights to help inform Poland’s NECP and future net-zero milestones, policies, national strategies, and long-term investments.
Sign up for emails on our homepage to receive updates on our modelling.
<a title="Carbon-Free Europe, Polish Clean Energy Leaders Convene for NECP &amp; Energy Systems Modeling Dialogue" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/196527949@N05/albums/72177720317203581" data-flickr-embed="true"><img src="https://live.staticflickr.com/65535/53610873318_f3486d35b0_z.jpg" alt="CFE Convenes Climate and Trade Leaders for Green Transatlantic Marketplace Discussion" width="640" height="480"></a>

Florian A. Schneider

Carbon Free 15

Carbon-Free Europe, Polish Clean Energy Leaders Convene for NECP & Energy Systems Modeling Dialogue

Tone Langengen

Senior Policy Advisor, Climate & Energy Policy at the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change

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NE Global: Europe needs every clean energy tool it can get to deliver net-zero

Innovation News Network: Is Europe Doing Enough to Achieve Carbon Neutrality? Pg. 375

Elena Benaim

Former Policy Analyst

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Annual EU Net-Zero Outlook 2022

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<h3>Overview of Modelling Analysis</h3>
As part of Carbon-Free Europe's (CFE) first analysis in 2022, CFE modelled five potential pathways for the EU and UK to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050.  The Core pathway is the least constrained, allowing countries to use all available clean energy technologies and assuming high levels of energy efficiency and electrification. This is the most feasible, cost-effective pathway to net-zero.  The other four pathways are designed to explore how different policy and implementation constraints impact the route to carbon-neutrality. To learn more about the other pathways and our full 2022 analysis, visit <a href="https://www.carbonfreeeurope.org/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">www.carbonfreeeurope.org/modelling/archive/2022</a>.
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<h2>Today’s Energy System</h2>
In 2019, 78% of the UK’s energy supply came from fossil fuels (3.5% from coal, 39.5% from gas, and 35% from oil). Nuclear energy supplied 8% and renewable energy sources, including biofuels, provided 12%. The most emissions come from transportation (27% of total GHG emissions), followed by residential and commercial buildings (17%), electricity (13%), and industry (10%). 2019 is a good baseline year to understand Europe’s long term energy demand and supply since impacts from the pandemic have heavily skewed data from 2020-2021. 2019 is also the most recent year for which final Eurostat energy balance data is available.
<h2>Key Takeaways: The Core Pathway in 2050</h2>
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The UK’s most feasible and cost-effective pathway to net-zero is the Core pathway, which includes the use of every available clean energy technology including nuclear energy and carbon capture. In this pathway, by 2050, the UK’s estimated electricity mix is 51% wind, 9% solar, 39% nuclear, and 1% gas. The Core pathway requires 770 billion pounds of investment through 2050 in key technologies including electricity generation and storage, clean fuels, direct air capture, and heat pumps.
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In a carbon-free economy, the UK becomes a key energy producer, building more nuclear power and offshore wind than any EU country. The UK expands its electric generation capacity by an additional 59 gigawatts (GW) of nuclear power and 96 GW of offshore wind in the Core pathway. 
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Abundant domestic nuclear power and offshore wind enables the UK to become a leading producer of low-carbon hydrogen. In the Core pathway, the UK becomes the second largest producer of high-temperature electrolysis and fourth largest producer of low-temperature electrolysis supported by availability of offshore wind and nuclear heat. 
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The UK becomes an essential exporter of electricity and hydrogen to mainland Europe. To deliver this energy, the UK becomes the second largest constructor of new electricity transmission (39 GW of new connections to other countries in the Core pathway) and the tenth largest builder of new hydrogen pipelines (13 GW in the Core pathway up to 44 GW in constrained pathways). 
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Carbon capture is used to reduce emissions from cement production and yield negative emissions in biofuel production. Captured carbon is sequestered in geologic formations. The UK stores up to 71 million tons of CO2 in geologic storage reservoirs annually by 2050. In the Core pathway, UK is the fourth largest storer of captured carbon, storing 36 million tons. 
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The UK ramps up biofuel production to replace fossil fuels primarily in aviation and chemical manufacturing. By 2050, the UK becomes the sixth largest producer of biofuels, producing 6600 kilotons of oil equivalent (ktoe) in the Core pathway.
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 The UK sees the second largest reduction in consumer gas demand and third largest in consumer oil demand. This is because the UK is a relatively large consumer of oil and gas among EU + UK countries today, and can leverage a diverse array of clean energy resources to displace fossil fuels by 2050.1
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Electricity demand will increase by 240%. As the UK electrifies buildings, transport and parts of industry, and begins using electricity to produce hydrogen, electricity demand is modeled to increase by approximately 240% in 2050.
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The UK will need to ramp up the pace of renewables deployment by as much as 3.5 times to decarbonise. From 2011 to 2020, the UK built on average 4 gigawatts of renewables a year. To meet demand, the UK will need to build 5-14 gigawatts annually (representing a 125-350% increase). 
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The UK can dramatically reduce its dependence on natural gas-fired boilers for space and water heating. Modelling shows natural gas consumption for residential space heating gas boilers can reduce from 14,445 ktoe to 8,235 ktoe by 2035, and further reduce to 2,275 ktoe by 2040—a 75% reduction in this timeframe.
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<h2>Key Energy Metrics</h2>
The table below shows key energy system metrics from the Core pathway, which is the most cost-effective, feasible trajectory to net-zero. The table also shows a range for each metric. That range is generated by comparing the Core pathway to four other modelled pathways designed to evaluate specific constraints. 
The Slow Demand Transformation pathway imposes delays in electrification of surface transportation, heating, and industry. The 100% Renewables pathway relies strictly on renewables, phases out nuclear power, and prevents carbon capture and sequestration. The Limited Renewable Siting pathway restricts the deployment of wind and solar to reflect land-use and siting constraints. The Domestic Preference pathway prioritises domestic energy supplies and reduces transborder transmission lines and pipelines. 
We provide a range for each metric in the table to indicate which model results are highly sensitive to constraints, and which are consistent across all scenarios such that they represent low-regret strategies. We also show the UK’s rank in each metric relative to all EU + UK countries, to identify segments of the decarbonised energy economy where the UK has an opportunity to lead. 
<img src="//images.ctfassets.net/228txxvb8tt7/7fe1ygdt31dv5yUKL1jB9U/1beadbb7961c827b9f65f60cfc23e915/United_Kingdom_Summary_tableonly_082522.jpg" alt="United Kingdom Key Metrics from Different Pathways" width="1254" height="1126">

Modeling

Interactive Maps

Final Energy Demand

Electricity

Electric Capacity

Electric Capacity

Low Carbon Fuels

Low Carbon Fuels

Final Energy Demand

CCUS

CCUS

Hydrogen

Hydrogen